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Introduction
The very high pay of some executives has provoked public anger and official censure (see Hargreaves (2011) ). Hargreaves (p 69) concludes "wage inequality is part of a toxic form of free market capitalism a winner takes all system that allows monopolies to accrue and discourages the entrepreneurialism it is meant to facilitate."
In this paper we examine the costs of seemingly excessive pay awards to CEO's within the UK FTSE 100 in the last decade. We focus on the proportion of total board pay taken by the CEO as a proportion of the remuneration pool available to all the executives on the board and not just the top 5 or some other arbitrary cut-off point.
Evidence that firm performance deteriorates as the share of total remuneration, given to the 5 best paid executives, rises already exists for the US.
This metric is referred to as the "CEO pay slice" or CPS in much of the literature and we denote it as CPS ourselves henceforth. Bebchuk, Martijn, and Peyers (2011) present evidence on the relationship between CPS and corporate performance for a sample of large US companies. Bebchuk et al report that corporate value, as proxied by a number of performance mea-sures including Tobin's Q, post-earnings announcement share price responses, shareholder responses to acquisitions and executive turnover, all deteriorate as CPS rises. This suggests that a high CPS may reflect something other than a reasonable reward for services rendered to company shareholders. Too high a CPS may induce feelings of unfairness, or exploitation, amongst the junior ranks of the senior management team. Jordan (2011) has replicated many of these results using Australian data for the years 2008-2010 obtaining a similar pattern of results. This paper focuses on a potential weakness in the CPS as an inequality metric when applied to companies with boards containing both less than and more than five members, which accounts for about half the companies in our UK FTSE 100 sample. For such companies, with more than 5 board members, those executives from the sixth best paid and below do not have their pay included in the CPS measure of pay inequality. If the pay-performance relationship is constant across board size partitions of the sample then this is merely a technical quibble of little interest. But if pay-performance relationships vary systematically with board size then a more careful analysis becomes essential. In this paper we show that pay-performance relationships do vary systematically with board size and are especially sharp in larger 2 board company cohorts where we might expect the CPS measure to be a poor proxy of pay inequality.
This paper provides additional evidence on the Bebchuk et al (2011) hypothesis that a higher CPS damages company performance for a sample of companies drawn from outside the US. We further ask whether the CPS measure, increasingly now invoked as the standard metric of executive pay inequality, is a helpful way to understand the relationship between executive pay inequality and corporate performance.
While much of the debate concerning managerial "power" to set their own pay has been US based. Conyon, Core, and Guay (2011) have shown that, controlling for risk, UK and US CEO pay levels are not as different as had previously been assumed. Hence comparable evidence from the UK concerning the impact of the distribution of executive pay within the board of directors on corporate performance is of interest in furthering the debate.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, Section 1, we review relevant literature and express the focus of our interest more fully. In Section 2 we give details of our research method in examining these issues and a description of the data we employ to investigate them and our data is presented in Section 3. Section 3 and 4 present our results 3 and interprets them. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and draws some policy conclusions.
Previous research.
Bebchuck et al (2011) raised concerns about how excessive rewards to CEO's in relation to their senior executive peers may adversely affect corporate performance and especially shareholder returns. Explanations of executive pay broadly conform to one of two alternative theoretical frames 1. optimal contracting, or the provision of incentives for shareholders to deliver for shareholders, 2. executive power, reflecting the ability of executives to insulate themselves from market pressures and pay themselves too much.
The optimal contracting perspective simply sees high rewards to CEOs as a reward to risks taken by very talented individuals. While CEO pay may be high it simply reflects the outcome of contracts freely entered into by shareholders seeking to attract the best managerial talent ( (Jensen and Meckling 1976) , Hart (1995) ). The purpose of large pay awards, especially stock option grants, in this model is to unify the interest of owners and managers in a corporation characterised by a division of ownership and control. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) strongly supported the second view in their landmark book. The specific argument that a high CPS damages shareholders can be seen as an exercise of unaccountable power by CEO's and hence must be seen as part of the presence of a broader assertion of CEO "power" at shareholders' expense. Bebchuk et al (2011) present evidence of the relationship between company performance, as proxied by Tobin's Q, and a number of dimensions of corporate performance. They present evidence on over 3,000 CEO's heading up over 2,000 companies in the years 1993-2004 and report on the relationship between corporate performance and CPS. They find high CPS companies.
• report lower profits,
• are more likely to "backdate" options,
• are more likely to undertake shareholder value destroying acquisitions,
• are more likely to retain a poorly performing CEO.
Hence for Bebchuk et al a high CPS is bad. It is bad because higher levels of CPS depress company's performance on a variety of credible performance measures 2 Part of the reason why it is difficult to detect the economic impact of a CEO's ability on corporate value is that the best companies tend to attract the most able CEO's to start with, while the worst companies must scavenge for whatever is left. Hence it is not clear which way the causality runs. Do great CEO's create great companies or do great companies simply have the good fortune to be able to recruit the most able CEOs? Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2010) try to resolve this causality issue by relating relative CEO pay (the CPS) to the performance of US CEOs leaving their companies over the years 1992-2002. They report higher CPS/CEO pay inequality is associated with 1. negative abnormal returns at the announcement of the CEO's departure, suggesting they were worth the pay they received, 2. better re-employment prospects upon departure, suggesting relatively high paid CEOs have both higher job-specific and general human capital endowments, 2 This finding accords with a huge amount of evidence reported by behavioural economists that most of us value "fairness" and react badly to any perceived unfairness, or slight, others perpetrate against us (see Fehr and Gachter (2004)) 6 3. CEOs joining companies where performance also improves subsequent to their arrival, suggesting they can add value both with their current company and elsewhere.
These findings suggest that the high pay of CEOs may indeed reflect their ability to create value for shareholders. Below we seek to shed light on the degree to which this result holds true for UK FTSE 100 CEOs in the last decade.
Corporate performance and board size.
Much of the debate concerning the distribution of executive pay has invoked the CPS/top slice measure. This asks how much the CEO earns as a proportion of the best five paid executives on the board. Once board membership exceeds five members this metric remains constant, as the sixth member of the board and beyond do not see their pay enter into the calculation. This is fine so long as board size and corporate performance are unrelated. But if not, and we aim to show this is the more credible scenario, then the CPS measure is placed in doubt. If both corporate performance and pay inequality vary with board size a potential for omitted variable bias arises.
The direction of any omitted variable bias thus induced is, a priori, un-7 clear. But omitted variable bias also enlarges standard errors in regression based tests and this second form of bias can either compound that arising in the mean effect, or offset it depending on the direction of bias in the estimated mean. The much reported finding (for example see (Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells 1998) ) that smaller boards make better decisions seems to accord with a belief that larger groups find it hard to reach consensus, or at least to do so quickly, suggests such an omitted variable bias may be present.
That corporate performance is affected by board size is already well chronicled in the literature. Yermack (1996) found a clear decline in returns to shareholders 3 as board size increased for a sample of large US companies in the period 1984-1991. This finding appeared robust to the inclusion of standard controls for a sample company's industry and size. Later Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) were able to confirm that more profitable companies had smaller boards on average using a sample of 900 Finnish companies, including some far smaller companies than those included in Yermack's earlier study.
For the UK Guest (2009) reports results that largely confirm the dele-3 As captured by Tobin's Q 8 terious effects of larger boards on company performance using three performance metrics, including shareholder returns. Guest find this result is robust to standard econometric controls for endogeneity, such as using general method of moments estimation which conditions upon the company's prior performance. This confirmed earlier evidence on a variety of European states reported a decade before by Conyon and Foreman-Peck (1998) .
Research Method
Initially we focus on whether changes in the proportion of salary going to the CEO has affected corporate performance, as measured by shareholder returns, and how this varies with board size. We then ask whether the relationship between board size and corporate performance/pay-inequality relationship conditions pay/performance elasticities. For it is these very pay/performance elasticities that have been central to debate concerning the fairness of executive compensation. 9
Measures of salary inequality amongst senior executives
We measure the shifting distribution of CEO pay and its greater inequality over time by movements in the Gini coefficient for each of these variables.
The Gini coefficient is a simple measure of inequality already much used in studies of income inequality (see Sen and Foster (1997) and Cowell (1995) ).
The Gini coefficient measures the incremental percentage of income accounted for by the richest person in the group as a proportion of all income, as compared to that associated with an equal distribution of income. A Gini coefficient of one denotes the richest person getting all the income, that is, complete inequality. A Gini coefficient of zero denotes completely equal shares in income for everyone in the economy, that is, complete equality.
Each Gini coefficient value reported below should therefore be interpreted as a premium in executive pay over and above what we would expect if all executives on the board were paid an equal share of the total board of directors pay pot 4 .
While the Gini coefficient has various mathematical representations it can be expressed as simply one half of the relative mean difference, defined as the arithmetic average of the absolute value differences, between all pairs of incomes. So G can be expressed
( 1) where, y is the variable whose inequality is to be judged (here executive pay), µ is the average level of income across members of the group (say a company board) and n is the size of the population (or board size).
The Gini measure of pay-inequality thus has two primary advantages
• for smaller boards, of less than five members, the Gini metric can still be calculated,
• for larger boards, of more than five members, all board members, and not just the five highest paid, have their pay enter into the Gini index measure of pay inequality (unlike the CPS measure).
Measures of corporate performance
So far we have focused on the costs of employing highly paid executives, and especially CEOs. In this section we consider the potential benefits to shareholders in terms of improvements in shareholder returns on equity.
In this paper we focus upon just one of Bebchuk et al (2011) value metrics, returns to shareholder. We also use "abnormal" share price performance of the corporation employing the CEO as captured by the 3-factor asset pricing model of Fama and French (1993) 
as a corporate performance benchmark. Where R it − R f t is the stock market premium commanded by the stock, R M − R f t is the standard market premium offered over the risk free-rate, as in the standard CAPM, SMB is the premium/discount paid on the smallest 30% of stocks traded by market capitalisation, as against the biggest 30% by market capitalisation. HML is the premium/discount paid by stocks ranked in the highest 30% of the book to market distribution, as compared to those ranked in the lowest 30% of the book to market distribution.
Data
Our CEO executive pay database is comprised of payments made to executives employed by UK FTSE 100 constituent members in the period March 1998 to March 2010 provided by Hemscott 5 part of the Morningstar group.
The data consists of 6046 individual executive years taken from 127 companies who featured in the UK FTSE 100 during our sample period.
Data on shareholder returns is taken from the London Share Price database, which is described in Staunton (2012) . A distinct advantage of this database is its coverage of both live and "dead" companies in the database, thus mitigating at least one source of survivorship bias. The database also captures a true measure of liquidating returns to shareholders, as opposed to the -100% return implicitly assumed in price based return measures.
The data on factor mimicking portfolios for estimating the Fama and French (1993) model are taken from the Exeter XFi website 6 described in Gregory, Tharyan, and Huang (2009 Table 2 is only for board's containing 5 or more members the Gini coefficient we report is bounded below the CPS metric of earlier research. But the difference in levels between CPS and Gini metrics is small compared to the huge difference in variation between the two inequality metrics. The Gini coefficient is six times more volatile than the CPS metric if variation is measured by the
The use of the Gini coefficient enables us to measure inequality at a level beyond that captured by focussing upon on the CEO's remuneration alone.
Thus we extend our measure of executive pay inequality to capture that associated with the 3, 5, and ten best paid executives. Table 3 shows the distributional properties of these broader metrics. Confining discussion to the first ten ranked positions, where the vast majority of our data clusters, the CEO stands all too clearly as primus inter pares with the emphasis very much on his/her primacy. The Gini coefficient falls substantially once we measure it for the 3 best paid directors. So discussion of executive pay inequality as a major policy issue most probably only makes sense in the UK if consideration is entirely focused on the CEO highest paid executive rather than the senior management team as a whole.
Inequality and board size.
To get a sense of how inequality varies with board size we plot our two inequality measures by board size group in members regardless of board size.
So only the Gini coefficient can capture variation in inequality for companies with board sizes greater than 5. Since such companies make up 43% of our sample company-years this seems a large sacrifice to make to adopt the CPS measure and a striking reason to prefer our Gini inequality index measure because it offers a far more comprehensive measure of executive pay inequality.
Only if the pay-performance relationship is constant across companies with board sizes smaller than and larger than five members is such an omis- the Gini coefficient inequality metric spikes much more (rising from a premium of 6% to 10% for example). The explanation for this cannot be greater inequality in pay amongst smaller boards, since these companies (with less than 5 directors) are not included in the Figure 3 comparison anyway. So the explanation must be greater inequality in larger boards containing executives paid a a small amount compared to the CEO.
Could it be that these larger boards, with comparatively poorly paid "place men" account for the poor performance of board's with very unequal executive pay? If so, the examination of the effect of CEO pay on corporate performance may be conflating two issues; the well documented impact of board size on corporate performance/shareholder returns, and the impact of pay inequality itself upon the same variable. We try to disentangle the effect of these two interacting variables in our reported results below. Table 4 and Figure 3 show the impact of board size on the sensitivity of corporate value to executive pay inequality, as measured by CPS and the Gini coefficient. Table 4 shows both the overall Spearman rank correlation coefficient between changes in raw shareholder returns and pay inequality prevailing in our four board size groups (1=less than 5, 2=6 to 10, 3=11 to 20, 4=20 or more). Figure 4 gives a graphical representation of the shareholder return sensitivity to pay inequality implied by Table 4 . Overall a fairly weak correlation is found between shareholders' returns and executive pay inequality, this is small and negative for both CPS (-0.042) and the Gini coefficient (-0.032) inequality metrics 9 .
9 Sample sizes for our 4 board of director size grouping are given in Tables 5 and 6 20 But it is at the extremes of the board size distribution distribution that very different inferences arise using the Gini and CPS metrics of pay inequality. Amongst the cohort of companies with the smallest boards, five members or less, pay inequality appears damaging whichever executive pay inequality metric is used. This makes intuitive sense because it is in such small boards that personal ties are likely to ensure than pay differences are most keenly felt. Nevertheless the large negative correlation between pay inequality and returns to shareholders for the cohort of companies with five directors (CPS cannot be calculated for smaller boards) reminds us of the reduction in the CPS sensitivity to underlying inequality amongst all board members (and not just the five highest paid) for larger boards.
In the group of companies with a board size of between six and ten greater executive pay inequality appears to serve to raise corporate performance, or at least raise returns to shareholders if the Gini metric of executive pay inequality is used. This finding is in direct contradiction to the findings of prior research ( for example Bebchuk, et al) which argues for a uniformly negative impact of executive pay inequality. The CPS measure here shows a uniformly negative effect of executive pay inequality on shareholder returns in below.
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accordance with the reported findings of previous studies using that measure.
For boards of ten members this measure of executive pay inequality ignores the salary of half the board in measuring the degree of inequality. As The diminution of corporate value by executive pay inequality is less marked when a CPS measure is used but is also most marked for large boards of more than twenty members (Group 4 in our board size banding). It is of course for such boards that three-quarters or more of the executives on the board do not see their salary enter into the calculation of the CPS metric of pay inequality. Hence it might appear that the CPS is making the strongest inferences about how pay inequality impacts upon corporate performance 22 where its usage seems most inappropriate.
4.4
The impact of board size on pay versus performance sensitivities.
The focus of our paper is decisively the impact of pay inequality on corporate performance rather than the standard pay-performance sensitivity as such.
Yet if our critique of the usage of CPS is to prove fruitful we would expect the sensitivity of the pay/performance relationship itself to be conditioned on board size. To investigate this implication of the previous results we return to the classic pay-performance sensitivity estimated by Jensen and Murphy (1990) for the US and more recently by Conyon et al (2011) for the UK and the US.
In Table 5 we consider changes in pay for only the ten best paid executives each company-year in our sample, unless there are less than ten members of the board recorded. We impose this restriction to prevent insignificant comparisons, with minor players on the board, blurring our results. We include only executives who stay with the same company in the consecutive years for which we calculate those executives' pay change. We calculate returns on an April to April basis to allow for publication of company results and hence market assessment of the executive team's performance. Initially we examine pay-performance relationships using raw annualised cumulative returns.
The results of standard pay-performance regressions of the form of equation (1) in Jensen and Murphy (1990) , are reported in Table 5 , Figure 4 gives Spearman rank correlation tests for the same dependency. Previous findings that increases in the pay awarded to executives and the returns shareholders receive for the executives' efforts bear almost no relationship is confirmed for the overall sample. But the interest in Table 5 , once again, lies in what happens once the estimation of pay-performance sensitivities are decomposed into the board size bandings previously considered.
The lower panels in Table 5 shows the sensitivity of changes in returns to changes in executive pay for the ten best paid executives. For the largest boards, with 21 or more members, pay-performance relationships are, positive, quite tight and clearly statistically significant. Elsewhere the estimated coefficient is either significant but smaller (board group 1, companies with 5 or less executives on the board) or insignificant and perversely signed (board groups 2 and 3, companies with six to twenty members of the board). This Table 4 suggest for such large companies executive pay inequality can be damaging to shareholder returns.
Hence one interpretation of our combined results is that pay rises for companies with larger boards improve corporate performance. However this is only if these pay increases are not given in a way that exacerbates existing pay inequality amongst board members.
Regression based tests of hypotheses are notoriously plagued by specification problems of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and peculiarities of functional form. So as a robustness check in Table 6 and Figure 4 we revisit pay-performance sensitivities, for the ten best paid executives, through the lens of Spearman rank correlations. A Spearman rank correlation is a nonparametric measure of correspondence less likely to have its results distorted by outlier observations and non-linearities in the observed pay/performance relationships.
Once again, as for the regression based tests, our U-shaped pay performance relationship indicates executive pay increases are associated with higher shareholders' returns for the smallest and largest board size bands, while the relationships in the other board size groups are not. Indeed for smaller boards, those with five members or less, the Spearman rank correlation, while marginally positive, is tiny and (just) insignificant at the 95% confidence interval. It is positive and significant for large boards, where increases in CEO pay appear to have substantial motivating effects. Hence it is for these very companies that the CPS measure, so central to prior published research, is likely to represent executive pay inequality very poorly indeed.
Robustness checks
In this section we control for two of the most obvious sensitivities of our results to the particular research methods followed in constructing them. The first concerns the sample chosen and the second the particular way in which we measure corporate performance. Firstly we control for risk in measuring variations in shareholder returns. Secondly we show how the division of the sample between executive and non-executive directors (NEDs) influences our results.
Controlling for risk.
Our reported results, using the Gini pay inequality metric, suggest compa- (2).
Such abnormal returns are simply the difference between raw shareholder returns and those that would be predicted by Fama-French 3-factor model of equation (2) above when normal sensitivities to the three factors considered are assumed.
These tests are reported as Figure 5 (a risk-adjusted version of Figure 3) and Figure 6 (a risk-adjusted version of Figure 4) below. Estimates of the three factor loading are obtained by running Fama-French 3-factor model regressions for the five years/60 months prior to the company-year return considered. These factor sensitivities are then imposed on the data for the relevant company-year to generate a "abnormal" return value.
Overall we conclude the effect of risk-adjustments on our results is to simplify and sharpen them. Specifically the underlying sensitivity of payinequality/performance is positive throughout all board size groups, but is strongest amongst the smallest (with 5 members or less) and largest (with more than 21 members) boards . Note Here σ denotes the standard deviation of the variable and c v its coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to its mean value). 
Note. Calculated using data for the ten best paid corporate executives in each company-year, or fewer when the board has less than ten members. Reported t-values are constructed according to White (1980) robust methods. The various dummies included are defined according to our board size groupings. So board group=2 equals 1 for company-years where board size is greater than five but less than ten board group=3 equals 1 for company-years where board size is greater than ten but less than twenty and, finally, board group=4 equals 1 for company-years where board sizes is greater than twenty. 0.378 0.018 38 Note. The various dummies included are defined according to our board size groupings. So boardgroup=2 equals 1 for company-years where board size is greater than five but less than ten board group=3 equals 1 for companyyears where board size is greater than ten but less than twenty and, finally, board group=4 equals 1 for company-years where board sizes is greater than twenty. -0.16 0.33 16 Note. The various dummies included are defined according to our board size groupings. So boardgroup=2 equals 1 for company-years where board size is greater than five but less than ten board group=3 equals 1 for companyyears where board size is greater than ten but less than twenty and, finally, board group=4 equals 1 for company-years where board sizes is greater than twenty. Figure 4 : Spearman rank correlation between raw shareholders' returns and inequality metrics. Note Where Group 1 consists of companies with five or fewer directors on the board, Group 2 consists of companies with five to ten directors, Group 3 consists of companies with eleven to twenty directors and, finally Group 4 consists of companies with more than twenty directors on the board. Note Calculated using data for the ten best paid corporate executives in each company-year, or fewer when the board has less than ten members. Where Group 1 consists of companies with five or fewer directors on the board, Group 2 consists of companies with five to ten directors, Group 3 consists of companies with eleven to twenty directors and, finally Group 4 consists of companies with more than twenty directors on the board. Here returns are adjusted according to the Fama-French 3 factor model benchmark adjusted returns where regressions to estimate the factor loadings on of the form
which are estimated on five years of monthly data, or 60 months, in the period just before the year for which the rank correlation is measured.
